Background: abuse of dominance

Article 102 of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union (and the national equivalents thereof) prohibits companies from abusing a dominant market position. A company is dominant when it holds such market power that it can operate independently of competitors, customers, and ultimately consumers. Dominant companies have a special responsibility not to abuse their powerful market position by restricting competition, either in the market where they are dominant or in separate markets.

The concept of abuse is an open standard – one that evolves alongside market dynamics and technological innovation, particularly in digital markets. Abusive conduct may take many forms, including excessive pricing, refusing to supply essential goods or services to competitors and ‘self-preferencing’.

Self-preferencing

According to the Commission, Google abused its dominant position by favouring its own advertising technology (self-preferencing) at the expense of competitors, advertisers and online publishers. In case law of the ECJ (the landmark Google Shopping case), it was confirmed that dominant digital firms may face regulatory scrutiny when they prioritize their own services over competitors on their platforms.

However, not all self-preferencing is unlawful. As clarified by the ECJ in Google Shopping, such conduct only constitutes an abuse when it goes beyond competition on the merits and has the potential to exclude competitors from the market. Determining whether this threshold is met requires a comprehensive assessment of all relevant circumstances – not just the nature of the conduct itself, but also the characteristics of the affected markets and the actual or potential impact on competition within those markets.

Google, by self-preferencing, abused its dominant position

In its press release dated 5 September 2025, the Commission announced that it had found that Google abused its dominant position through self-preferencing since at least 2014. The Commission concluded that Google abused its dominant positions in (i) the market for publisher ad servers and (ii) the market for programmatic ad buying tools for the open web by:

  • Favouring its own ad exchange AdX in the ad selection process run by its dominant publisher ad server DFP by, for example, informing AdX in advance of the value of the best bid from competitors which it had to beat to win the auction.
  • Favouring AdX in how its ad buying tools Google Ads and DV360 place bids on ad exchanges. For example, Google Ads was avoiding competing ad exchanges and mainly placing bids on AdX, thus making it the most attractive ad exchange.”

Google under the EU Antitrust Lens

This is not the first time Google has faced EU antitrust penalties. Over the past decade, Google has faced multiple antitrust sanctions from the Commission (please also refer to our earlier blog). The current fine is the second highest ever imposed on Google:

  • 2017 – EUR 2.42 billion for abuses linked to Google Shopping.
  • 2018 – EUR 4.34 billion for practices related to the Android operating system.
  • 2019 – EUR 1.49 billion for restricting competition in online advertising.

In view of these precedents, Google’s conduct was qualified as recidivism, which resulted in a 60% increase in the amount of the current fine.

Broader strategy to increase oversight of the digital market

The European Union’s case against Google is part of a broader regulatory push to rein in the power of dominant digital platforms. In recent years, the EU has rolled out landmark legislation, including the Digital Markets Act (DMA) and the Digital Services Act (DSA) (please also refer to our earlier blog), aimed at enhancing transparency, promote fair competition, and ensuring accountability in the digital space.

These initiatives mark a shift from reactive enforcement to proactive regulation, aiming to create a more balanced digital ecosystem where innovation can thrive without being stifled by entrenched market power. In this respect, the Netherlands Authority for Consumers and Markets recently launched a campaign to increase awareness on the Digital Services Act and opened an investigation into Snapchat for potential non-compliance with the DSA.

Divestment as potential structural remedies

Google must propose remedies within 60 days. If the Commission finds them insufficient, and subject to Google’s right to be heard, it may impose further corrective measures. The Commission has already indicated its preliminary position that only a structural remedy – specifically, the divestiture of certain Google services – would effectively resolve the underlying conflicts of interest.

This approach is notably rare in the Commission’s antitrust enforcement history, with structural remedies having been imposed only twice before (ARA and ENI/RWE). This decision is equally significant in light of its timing, which aligns closely with parallel proceedings in the United States. The remedies phase of the U.S. trial concerning Google’s alleged adtech monopoly is scheduled to commence on 22 September, and the Commission’s recent EUR 2.95 billion fine further intensifies regulatory scrutiny.

Conclusion – what comes next

Google has announced that it will appeal the decision. However, Google must still propose remedies within 60 days.

Follow-on claims

These developments may pave the way for ‘follow-on claims’, allowing individuals or companies affected by the Commission’s decision to bring proceedings before national courts and seek damages. A Commission’s decision constitutes, in principle, binding proof that the behaviour took place and was illegal.

Loyens & Loeff closely monitors developments around digital markets and their enforcement in the Netherlands and the EU. We advise online platforms, marketplaces, and digital service providers on compliance strategies, risk assessments, and regulatory interactions. For tailored guidance, please contact our team below.